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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAbstract 
Recent empirical evidence suggests that the stock  of  public-sector  capital  may  be  an 
important  input  to  private  production.  This  paper  examines  the  business-cycle 
implications  of  productive  public  capital  in  a  two-sector,  dynamic  general-equilibrium 
model with endogenous fiscal policy.  In the model, public capital is a direct input to the  - 
neoclassical production technology, and public consumption goods provide direct utility to 
households.  The production of public and private goods takes place in separate sectors. 
At the optimum level of public capital, the rate of return on public investment is found to 
be  less than  that  on  private investment.  In  simulations, public  investment  and  public 
consumption  are procyclical,  and  the  capital  tax  is more  variable  than  the  labor  tax, 
features  also  observed  in  annual U.S. data.  The introduction  of  stochastic  shocks to 
households' preference for public consumption helps the model to match certain features 
of the data, namely, the high variability and low correlation of public expenditures relative 
to their private-sector counterparts over the business cycle. 
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A  growing body  of  research  incorporates public  capital  into  neoclassical growth  models.' 
Furthermore, in recent years, business-cycle research has begun to address the effects of government 
fiscal policy on  aggregate fluctuations. For example, Braun (1989) and  McGrattan (1991) study the 
effects of distortionary taxation on business cycles, Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1992) and 
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1  992) examine the impact of time-varying public consumption expenditures, 
and Braun and McGrattan (1993) study wartime fluctuations in a model with government-owned (but 
privately  operated) capital.  Baxter  and  King  (1993) discuss  the  temporary  and  long-run effects of 
changes in public consumption, public investment, and tax rates. A common feature of all these papers 
is that government policy is viewed as exogenous. In contrast, this paper undertakes the study of fiscal 
policy and business cycles in a model that endogenizes all  variables of interest. I then subject the model 
to the same kind  of quantitative comparisons with  U.S.  data that have been  widely  used in the real 
business-cycle literature. 
The framework for the analysis is a two-sector,  dynamic general-equilibrium model with an 
infinitely lived, representative househoId. The government solves a dynamic version of  the Rarnsey 
(1927) optimal tax  probIem in which the endogenous policy variables are public investment, public 
consumption, and tax  rates on  labor and capital income (for simplicity, a period-by-period balanced 
budget is assumed). A distinction is made between the production of private and public goods. Private- 
sector firms produce private goods, which households purchase using after-tax income. The government 
sector produces non-rival public goods. Public investment goods augment the stock of  public capital, 
while public consumption goods provide direct utility to households. Public capital is a direct input to 
the constant-returns-to-scale production technologies in both sectors, as are sector-specific quantities of 
private capital and labor. The government does not assess fees for the use of public goods; rather, it 
levies distortionary taxes to finance their production. 
In equilibrium, the rate of return on public investment (as measured by the marginal product of 
'~ecent  models of endogenous growth with public capital include Barro (1990). Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1992), Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1992). and Glomm and Ravikumar (1993). Arrow  and  Kun. (1970) provide a comprehensive study of the existence 
and  stability properties of equilibrium in a neoclassical growth model with public capital. Pestieau and Possen (1978) study optimal 
redistributive fiscal policy in a model with public capital and exogenous savings. 
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impact of distortionary capital taxation and the higher depreciation rate assumed for private versus public 
capital. Both effects reduce the steady-state level of private capital and hence raise its marginal product. 
A  primary  finding  is  that  optimal  fiscal  policy  displays  procyclical  behavior  for  public 
investment and public consumption, in agreement with annual U.S.  data. The presence of public capital 
in the constant-returns-to-scale production function causes private firms to realize positive profits after 
private factors are paid their marginal products. This, in turn, causes the optimal steady-state tax  on 
capital to be  positive. Essentially, the govemment uses the tax  on private capital to collect a user fee 
for the  productive  services of  public  capital.  Furthermore,  in  simulations, the  optimal capital tax 
fluctuates over time to absorb budget shocks, while the optimal labor tax remains relatively stable. This 
characteristic can also be observed in estimates of average marginal tax rates for the U.S.  e~onomy.~ 
An  important  feature  of  the  model  is  the  introduction  of  stochastic  shocks  to  household 
- 
preferences for public consumption. These shocks are intended to represent unforeseen events that affect 
household  demand for public  goods, such as  national  defense, police protection, or disaster relief 
services. Specific examples might include the collapse of the Soviet Union (which reduced desired levels 
of U.S. defense spending) and the 1994 Los Angeles earthquake (which, so far, has resulted in more than 
$8 billion in federal disaster relief appropriations). The preference shocks cause adjustments along two 
margins: the mix  of  production between the private and government sectors, and the choice between 
public investment and public consumption. As  a result, the shocks help the model to match certain 
features of U.S. data, namely, the high variability and low correlation of public expenditures relative to 
their private-sector counterparts over the business cycle. This result is similar to other examples in the 
business-cycle literature wherein a stochastic term in the household utility function can improve model 
performance, as demonstrated recently by  Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and  Bencivenga (1992).' 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2  provides some facts about public 
 ones, Manuem, and Rossi (1993) provide a formal treatment of the effect of profits on the optimal steady-state capital tax. The 
optimality of a statecontingent capital tax to absorb budget shocks is shown by Judd (1989) and Chari, Christiano. and Kehoe (1993). 
3~lemming  (1987) develops a model with shocks to the demand for public goods in a small open economy with exogenous wages 
and interest rates, and obtains procyclical government expenditures. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmcapital and public expenditures in the postwar U.S.  economy. Sections 3 and 4 describe the model and 
the solution method. Section 5 describes the choice of parameter values. Section 6 presents quantitative 
results from steady-state analysis and dynamic simulations, and section 7 concludes. 
2.  The Data 
The stock of public-sector capital in the United States is about one-third the size of the private 
capital stock. The largest single category of public capital comprises what is known as the economy's 
core infrastructure, namely, highways, streets, airports, transit systems, utilities, and the like. State and 
local governments own about two-thirds of the nation's  public capital, while the federal government 
owns the stock of military capital, which represents about one-fifth of the total. A number of empirical 
studies (Ratner [1983], Aschauer [1989a], Munnell [1990, 19921, and Lynde and Richmond [1992]) 
suggest that public capital may be an important input to private production. The primary evidence for 
the public capital hypothesis can be seen in figure 1, which plots U.S. labor productivity versus the stock 
of  public capital from  1947 to  1992.4  The well-documented slowdown in the growth trend  of  U.S. 
productivity that began in the early 1970s coincides with a similar decrease in the growth trend of public 
capital. This observation is the basis for many claims regarding the productive effects of  public capital. 
The association of  these trends does not prove, however, the existence of  a causal link running from 
public capital to  output. Indeed, a number of  studies cite evidence that  disputes the public capital 
hypothesis. These include Tatom (1991), using aggregate U.S.  data, Hulten and Schwab (1993). using 
regional data,  and  Holtz-Eakin  (1992), using  state-level data. Eberts (1990) provides evidence that 
causation between public capital and output runs in both directions, using metropolitan-level data.' 
Theoretically, public capital could act as either a substitute or a complement to private capital 
in  production.  For  example, public investment might  "crowd  out" private investment if  firms rely 
increasingly on public capital for productive purposes rather than expanding their own capacity. On the 
4 In  figure  1, output is real GNP  in  1987 dollars from Citibase. Public capital  is government-owned equipment, structures, and 
residential capital (with and  without military capital) in  1987 dollars from Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United States. 
U.S. Department of Commerce (1993). All series have been  divided by  the total labor hour series, LHOURS,  in Citibase. 
'see  Munnell (1992) and  Aschauer (1993) for a summary and  critique of the various empirical studies on  this topic. 
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investment. Aschauer (l989b) and Lynde and Richmond (1992) present empirical evidence (using post- 
war U.S.  data) suggesting that the complementary effect dominates, although both effects appear to be 
operating. Furthermore, the empirical studies that find support for the public capital hypothesis are 
consistent with a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function that exhibits constant returns to scale in 
labor, private capital, and public capital. 
Figure 2 compares trends in U.S.  private and public investment, while figure 3 compares the 
analogous consumption trends. During the postwar period, private investment avenged 21 percent of 
GNP, while public investment (including military) averaged 4.5 percent. The corresponding averages for 
private and public consumption are 56 percent and 17 percent, re~pectively.~  The non-trivial size of the 
government sector relative to the private economy motivates a model in which government policy is not 
only included, but is endogenized in a full general-equilibrium framework 
Figures 4 and 5 depict the business-cycle movements of the annual investment and consumption 
series from 1947 to 1992, where cyclical components have been extracted by detrending each series with 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter? Note that public investment and public consumption both tend to move 
procyclically. In figure 4a, the correlation coefficient between total public investment and real GNP is 
0.59. If  military investment is excluded, the correlation is 0.56.  In  the private sector, the correlation 
between investment and real GNP is 0.69. Even though both types of investment are procyclical, figure 
4b shows that the contemporaneous correlation between private and public investment is quite low, 
ranging only from 0.04 to 0.25, with the higher value obtained when military investment is excluded. 
The  standard  deviation  of  total  public  investment is  about  1.7  times  larger  than  that  of  private 
investment, mostly due to large increases in military investment that occurred during the Korean and 
Vietnam Wars.  Excluding military investment, the standard deviations of public and private investment 
'In  figure 2, the first series for private investment is fixed investment + consumer durables expenditures + residential investment, 
from Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wedfh  in fhe United Sfutes, U.S. Department of Commerce (1993). The second series is gross 
private  investment  (GPIQ),  from  Citibase.  In  figure  3,  private  consumption  is  expenditures  on  nondurables  and  services 
(GCNQ+ GCDQ), from Citibase. Public consumption is government purchases of goods and  services (GGEQ) from Citibase, minus 
public investment (this avoids double counting). All series are annualized and  expressed in  1987 dollars. 
'See Rescott (1986). The smoothing parameter for the  filter was set at A=100, since all data are at annual frequency. 
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consumption and 0.71  for private consumption.'  The contemporaneous correlation between the two 
consumption series is 0.16. The standard deviation of public consumption is about five times larger than 
the standard deviation of  private consumption. The temporary  spikes observed in the U.S.  series for 
public investment and public consumption provide a justification for incorporating shocks to the demand 
for public goods in the model. 
3.  The Model 
The model economy consists of  many identical, infinitely lived households, identical private 
fm,  and  the government. Public and private goods are produced  in separate sectors, each using  a 
technology that exhibits constant returns to scale in the three productive inputs: labor, private capital, 
and public capital. The form of the technology implies that private firms earn an economic profit equal 
to the difference between the value of output and payments to private factor inputs. As owners of the 
firms,  households receive net profits in the form of  dividends, but consider them to be  outside their 
control, similar to wages and interest rates.  The govemment finances production of  public  goods by 
levying distortionary taxes on households and fm.  It is assumed that profits are initially taxed at the 
firm level, then distributed as dividends and taxed again at the household level. This formulation is 
intended to capture the double taxation of  corporate dividends in the U.S.  economy. Furthermore, I 
assume that the government can distinguish between labor and capital income, but cannot distinguish 
between the different categories of capital income, such as profits, dividends, and interest. Consequently, 
there are only two types of distortionary taxes in the model: a labor tax and a capital tax.9 
'At  quarterly frequency, the public consumption series (GGEQ from Citibase) displays much weaker procyclical behavior.  From 
1947:IQ to  1992:IVQ, the comelation with real GNP is 0.33. For the public investment series, data are available only at  annual 
frequency. Because government budgets are enacted into law annually, the annual correlations would appear to be more relevant for 
a model with endogenous public expenditures. 
9~n  a model with profits, Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993) show that a restriction on the menu of tax  instruments is needed for 
optirnality of a positive tax on capital in the steady state. Guo and Lansing (1994) demonstrate that the structure of dividend taxation 
(double versus single) can affect the stability of the steady state in a one-sector version of this model. 
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Households maximize a discounted stream of  within-period utility functions over consumption 
and leisure, subject to a sequence of  budget constraints. The decision problem can be summarized as 
where  H,  = h,,  + h,,  (1) 
subject to 
c, +x,  5  (l-~,,)w,H,  +(I-~,,)(r,K,+ft,)  +7,,8K, 
-. 
k ,,+,  =:  (1-6 )k,, +x,,  ,  0<6  <l,  k,,,  k2,  given 
VI+l  = Pv  V,  + 5,+1  9  O<pv<l,  5,-iid(O,o:),  v,  given.  --  (5) 
In  the  above  equations, subscripts  1 and  2  refer to  the  private  and  government sectors, 
respectively.  Households  supply  labor  and  capital to both  sectors.  The term  c, represents private 
consumption goods. Households are endowed with one unit of time each period and work a total of H, 
hours during period t.  Household preferences include a separable term representing the utility provided 
by public consumption goods g, . Furthermore, these preferences are subjected to serially correlated 
exogenous shocks v,  that  are revealed to agents at the beginning  of  period  t.  Examples  of  public 
consumption goods that  might  affect household utility  are  national defense, police  protection, and 
government provision of food and housing during natural disasters. Public goods are assumed to be non- 
congestable and free of specific user charges. They are also nontradeable, i.e., no market exists wherein 
households may buy  or sell public goods. 
Households maximize the utility function in (1) over c, ,  h,, ,  and h,  ,  but view g, as outside their 
control. The logarithmic form of  the within-period utility function has been chosen for tractability and 
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consumption does not affect the marginal utility of  private consumption, an assumption supported by 
parameter estimates in  McGrattan, Rogerson, and  Wright  (1993). The symbol El is the expectation 
operator conditional on information available at time t, and P is the constant household discount factor. 
The  fact  that  utility is  linear in  hours  worked  reflects  "indivisible labor," as described by 
Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985). This means that all variation in economywide hours worked is due 
to variations in the number of employed workers, as opposed to variations in hours per worker. In a 
decentralized economy, these authors show that the utility function in (1) can be supported by a lottery 
that  randomly assigns workers to employment or unemployment each period,  with the firm  (or the 
government employer) providing full unemployment insurance. Wage contracts call for households to 
be paid based on their expected (rather than actual) number of hours worked. Real business-cycle models 
with indivisible labor are better able to match some key characteristics of  aggregate labor market data. 
Specifically, U.S.  data display a large volatility of  hours worked  relative to labor productivity and  a 
weakly positive or even slightly negative correlation between hours and productivity.I0 
Equation  (2) represents the period budget  constraint of  the household. The tern  XI  and  K, 
represent total private investment and total private capital, respectively. Private capital is assumed to be 
"sector specific" in the sense that total capital cannot be reallocated freely between sectors at the start 
of  each period, but instead must be reallocated via the investment process. This feature is reflected in 
the separate laws of  motion  for k,, and k,,  equations (3) and  (4). The distribution of  capital across 
sectors is relevant for household decisions in this model because, in equilibrium, the government's state- 
contingent policy rules are functions of both k,, and k, .  All private capital is assumed to depreciate at 
the constant rate 6. In equilibrium, the after-tax returns to labor and capital are equalized across sectors. 
Households derive income by  supplying labor and capital to both sectors at rental rates w,  and 
r, ,  and pay taxes on labor and capital income at rates z, and z,, respectively. An  additional source of 
income is the fm'  net profits  ft,, which are distributed to households as dividends and are taxed at 
the same rate as interest income. The term zh6K, represents the depreciation allowance built into the 
'Osee  Hansen (1985). Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), and Hansen and Wright (1992). 
7 
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control. The household decision variables c,, h,,,  h,,  k,,,  ,  and k,+,  are all known at time t. 
3.2  Household Optimality 
The Lagrangian for the households' problem is defined as 
1l  = E,C  p1  {lnc, -  A HI + exp(v,)B lng,  + 
1-0 
The household first-order .conditions with respect to the indicated variables and the associated 
transversality conditions are  - 
The government uses these equilibrium conditions to recover the appropriate tax  rates, 7,  and 
7,.  that support the household equilibrium allocations in a decentralized economy. Note that the first- 
order conditions for hi,  and k+,  yield the same equation for i=l, 2. This implies that if the before-tax 
prices w,  and r, are the same across sectors (as assumed here), the government will announce 7,  and 
7,  to also be the same across sectors. If w,  and r, were allowed to differ across sectors, the government 
would announce sector-specific tax rates in order to maintain the equilibrium condition of equal afer-tax 
returns across sectors. 
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Private-Sector Production 
Private-sector output y, is produced by identical firms that seek to maximize after-tax profits by 
using a technology that exhibits constant returns to scale in the three inputs, h,,, k,, ,  and kt,  where k,, 
is the stock of  public capital. Private-sector output consists of private consumption goods c, and private 
investment goods x,, and h.  The firm's  profits are taxed  at rate z,  The production technology is 
subjected to serially correlated exogenous shocks z, that are revealed to agents at the beginning of period 
t.  These shocks generate equilibrium business-cycle fluctuations in the modeL  Since the focus here is 
on the (detrended) business-cycle movements of  variables, the model abstracts from exogenous technical 
progress. Private-sector production can be summarized as 
subject to 
Zr+l  = P r '1 
+
 El+,  O<p,<l,  E,-iid(o,o,?),  z,  given. 
The private fi's  fmt-order conditions are" 
The fi's  after-tax profits, distributed to households in the form of  dividends, are 
"There is no need to distinguish between variables under the household's control and variables representing per capita quantities 
here, as is necessary when solving directly for a decentralized, competitive equilibrium. As noted by  Lucas and  Stokey (1983), the 
solution to the government's decision problem yields a set of policies that dictate household equilibrium allocations. These allocations 
determine the equilibrium prices r, and  w,. Thus. prices are not outside the government's control as they are for households. 
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Government-sector output y,,  involves the employment of workers, the rental of private capital 
(for example, office buildings), and the use of public capital (such as infrastructure and government- 
owned facilities or equipment). The government-sector technology exhibits constant returns to scale in 
the inputs ha, k,  ,  and kc,. Public capital is assumed to be "noncongestable" in the sense that the same 
capital stock is used as an input to both private- and government-sector production.12 Government-sector 
output consists of public consumption goods g, and public investment goods x,,.  Since there is no formal 
market for public goods, there is no requirement for the government to maximize any notion of "profit." 
However, following Uzawa (1966), I assume that the government employs labor and private capital in 
such a way as to minimize external production costs. This assumption permits the definition of a shadow 
price of public goods relative to private goods P,13  Technology shocks are assumed to be the same for 
both sectors, but are uncorrelated with preference shocks. Government-sector production is described as 
follows: 
subject to 
yGl  = up(r, ) k,:'  h,:'  &?I'  O<$i<l,  @I +$2+$3  = 
%+I  = PZZt  +&,+I  O<pz<l,  E,-iid(0,o:),  z0  given. 
I2~xperiments  with  diiferent versions of  the model indicate that the results are not substantially changed if  public capital is 
assumed to be fully congestable, i.e.,  if  separate stocks of public capital k,,  and h,,  are employed in the two sectors. 
I31n a standard two-sector growth model, the sectors are typically identified with consumption and investment goods, and a formal 
market exists for both goods. Here, there is no formal market for goods produced in the government sector. This setup shares some 
features of a home production model in which the two sectors are identified with market and nonmarket (home-produced) goods. See 
Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright (1991), Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991), and McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1993) for home 
production models in a businesscycle framework. 
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public goods relative to private goods.14 Also, since households earn income in  both  sectors, it  is 
necessary to define what is meant by GNP. Here, GNP is defined as income and profits generated in 
the private sector (y,), plus income earned in the government sector (w,  h,  +  r,  k,).  The expressions are 
akzl  ah,, 
Combining (16) with the private firm's profit maximization conditions (1 1) yields the following 
constraint imposed on the government's choice of policy: 
3.4  The Government's Problem 
The government chooses an optimal program of public expenditures and tax  rates to maximize 
the discounted utility of the household. The vector !PI  = {xc,, g, ,  T,,;,  T~ ) summarizes government policy 
implemented at time t.  The problem is a dynamic version of  the classic Rarnsey case, involving a 
Stackelberg game between  the  government and  households. To avoid time-consistency problems, I 
assume that the government can commit to a set of state-contingent policy rules announced at time zero. 
Also, to make the problem interesting, lump-sum taxes are ruled out. Otherwise, the government would 
elect to finance all future expenditures with an initial levy on private-sector assets. To simplify the 
formulation,  I further assume that  the  government  adheres to  a  period-by-period  balanced  budget 
l4~he  shadow price is the Lapnge  multiplier on the production constraint in the cost minimization problem. Equivalently, the 
expression for PC, can be obtained from the following shadow profit maximization problem for a hypothetical competitive fm  that 
produces public goods: max (PC,  yGl  - r, k,  - w,  h,  ). The (unobservable) profits earned by  such a fum  are  (1 - $, - & ) PGlyGl. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmconstraint, i.e.,  government debt is ruled out.15 With these assumptions, the government's problem is 
subject to 
(i)  household  first-order conditions and  budget  constraint, 
(ii)  private -fm  profit  maximization conditions, 
(iii)  government -sector cost minimization  condition, 
(vii)  lim Eo P'A,,  k ,,+,  = 0. 
I+=" 
Constraints (i) and (ii) summarize rational maximizing behavior on the part of private agents and 
constitute "irnplementability" constraints imposed on the government's choice of policy. Constraint (iii) 
is the cost minimization assumption for the government's use of private-sector  inputs, i.e., equation (18). 
Constraint (iv) is the government budget constraint, where outlays on the left side consist of  payments 
to labor and capital employed in the government sector. The last term on the right side of (iv) reflects 
the double taxation of  firm dividends. Constraint (v) is the resource constraint governing the production 
of  public goods.  Constraint (vi) is the  law  of  motion  for public  capital, where  is  gross public 
investment and 6, is the depreciation rate of  public capital.  Finally, (vi) is a transversality condition on 
the accumulation of  public capital, where 1C;,  is the marginal utility of  public consumption g, . 
The summation of  the household budget constraint (2) and the government budget constraint 
(1  9. iv) yields the following resource constraint for the private sector. Because the private-sector resource 
15~dding  government debt to the model introduces complications that I wish to avoid here. Specifically, equilibrium for a model 
with debt and capital imposes an ex ante arbitrage condition on  the expected returns from government bonds and private capital. The 
steady-state level of  debt is thus indeterminate (see Charnley [1985]). Furthennore, in a stochastic environment, the government can 
vary the ex post combination of the capital tax and  the bond  interest rate in  many different ways to raise needed revenue, yet still 
satisfy ex ante arbitrage (see Zhu  [I9921 and Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe [1991]). One method of resolving these complications is 
to assume an exogenous ratio of steady-state debt to GNP  and to restrict the government's ability to set the ex post bond  interest rate 
independently (see Lansing [1993a]). 
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of (19. iv) in the recursive version of the problem16 
4.  Solution of the Model 
The  government's  problem  under  commitment can  be  solved  using  the  unique  recursive 
algorithm developed by Kydland and Prescott (1980). A recursive structure is obtained by defining the 
household lagged shadow price  A,.,  to be  a "pseudo-state variable." Including this price in the state 
vector provides a link to the past by which the policymaker at time t considers the fact that household 
decisions in earlier periods depend on current policy by means of expectations. This is the mechanism 
by which the commitment problem can be solved using dynamic pr~grarnming.'~  Appendix A describes 
the procedure  for  formulating the  recursive version  of  (19)  and  numerically  solving  the  dynamic 
programming problem. 
5.  Calibration of the.  Model 
To  explore the quantitative predictions of the model, as many parameters as possible are assigned 
values in advance based on empirically observed features of  postwar U.S.  data Parameter choices are 
also guided by the desire to obtain steady-state values for key model variables that are consistent with 
long-run averages in the  U.S.  economy. Table  1 summarizes the  choice of  parameter values and is 
followed by  a brief description of how they were selected. 
16.4n alternative formulation for the two resource constraints would be  y, =  c, +x,, ++,  +xG, and yG,  =  g,. This implies that public 
consumption goods g, are produced in the govemment sector but that public investment goods x,,  are purchased from the private sector 
using tax  revenue. Experiments with  this version of the model  yielded less successful results (the correlation between public and 
private investment was too high). See Lansing (1993b) for further variations on  the present model, including a one-sector model with 
adjustment costs for public investment and  a two-sector model with  sector-specific technology shocks. 
17see  Lansing (1993a) for a more detailed discussion of  this method. 
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Agent  Parameters and Values 
Households 
-  ~  9, = 0.30 
Firms  9, = 0.62  6 = 0.07  p,  = 0.85  a, = 0.02 
9, = 0.08 
I$,  = 0.30 
Government  I$,  = 0.62  6,  = 0.04 
I$,  = 0.08 
The time period in the model is taken to be one year. This is consistent with the frequency of 
available data on public investment and tax rates. The discount factor of  P=0.962 implies an annual rate 
of time preference equal to 4 percent. The parameter A in the household utility function is chosen such 
that total hours worked is close to 0.3. This is in line with time-use studies, such as Juster and Stafford 
- 
(1991). which indicate that households  spend approximately one-third of  their discretionary time in 
market work.''  The value of B is chosen to yield a steady-state value of  gIGNP near 0.18, the average 
ratio for the U.S.  economy from  1947 to  1992. In  computing this average, public consumption was 
estimated by subtracting public investment from an annualized series for government purchases of goods 
and services (GGEQ  from Citibase). This was done to reduce double counting, since the series does not 
distinguish between government consumption and investment goods. 
The exponents in the Cobb-Douglas production functions are chosen to be the same for both 
sectors.  This  is because  estimates  of  private-  versus  government-sector output  elasticities are  not 
available. With these values, however, the shares of GNP in the model received by total private capital 
and total labor are close to levels estimated for the U.S.  economy (see Christian0 [1988]). Furthermore, 
these values yield a steady-state ratio of public investment to GNP near 0.045, consistent with the U.S. 
average (including military) from 1947 to 1992.19 With constant returns to scale in all inputs, the value 
''~otal hours worked is H=h,+h, .  The sector-specific values are h,=0.23 and h,=0.07.  These values imply that employment in 
the private sector is about three times larger than in the government sector. 
l9l'he  range of  empirical estimates for 0,  is quite large.  Aschauer (1989a) and  Munnell (1990) estimate values of  0,=0.39 
and 0.34,  respectively. Tatom (1991) estimates values in the range of 0 to 0.13,  and Holtz-Eakin (1992) estimates a value of  0,=0 
using state-level data. See Munnell (1992) and Aschauer (1993) for a summary and critique of  the empirical findings. 
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state level of 2,. because the government uses the tax on private capital to collect an indirect user fee 
for the productive services of public  capital. In the model, the steady-state ratio of  profits to GNP is 
0.06, and the resulting steady-state tax on capital is 0.27. 
The private capital depreciation nte of  m.07  is based on the value estimated in Braun and 
McGrattan  (1993) and is consistent with values commonly used in the real business-cycle literature. 
Together with the values of  P and 8,. this depreciation rate implies a steady-state ratio of private capital 
to GNP of  2.62  and a ratio of private investment to GNP of 0.18. The corresponding averages for the 
U.S. economy from 1947 to 1992 are 2.58 and 0.21. The public capital depreciation rate of 6~0.04  was 
estimated by regressing the linear law of motion on annual data for kc, and x,,  . 
The process governing technology shocks was estimated using annual data from 1947 to 1992. 
The series for z,  was constructed by computing the changes in output not accounted for by changes in 
the three productive inputs.20  The estimated parameters, pp0.85 and  0,=0.02,  represent values close 
to those estimated by  other authors, such as Benhabib and Jovanovic (1991). In the simulations, the 
estimated value of a, yields a standard deviation of output in the neighborhood of 2.5 percent, a value 
very close to the U.S. avenge of 2.46 percent over this period. The standard deviation of the preference 
shocks o5 was chosen to match the relative variability of  public versus private consumption in U.S. 
data. Over this period, the standard deviation of g, is about fives times larger than the standard deviation 
of c,.  Due to the lack of  any direct observations on  the preference shock, the persistence parameter p, 
is set equal to 0.85, the same value used for the technology shock. This choice reflects a belief that 
shocks that affect household demand for public consumption (such as wars or crime trends) tend to be 
highly correlated from one year to the next." 
,O~he  production function residual was measured as zI=  LnGNP, - 0.30MI  - 0.621nHr  - 0.08MG,.  The  private capital stock K,  is 
defied as futed private capital + stock of consumer durables + residential capital from Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wedth in the 
United States, U.S. Department of Commerce (1993). Real GNP and  the labor input  (HI  = LHOURS) are from Citibase. The public 
capital series includes military capital and  is described in  footnote 4. 
21~lemming  (1987) discusses the effect of changing the serial correlation properties of preference shocks. 
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6.1  Steady-State Results 
Table 2 shows the model's steady-state values versus the corresponding U.S.  averages from 1947 
to 1992. For the U.S.  data, two values are shown for the average values of x,  IGNP and k,IGNP.  The 
first includes military items and the second excludes these items. Two values are also shown for the 
average marginal tax  rates  7,  and 7,.  The first is computed  using tax  rate estimates in Barro and 
Sahasakul(1986) and Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981). The second uses tax rate estimates in McGrattan, 
Rogerson, and Wright (1993). For the most part, the choice of parameters yields steady-state values that 
are close to long-run averages in the U.S. economy. Under constant returns, the value of 8,  (= 1-8, -8,) 
controls the level of firm profits. It is interesting that a relatively small value of 8,  (which implies a 
ratio of profits to GNP of 0.06) is sufficient to induce an optimal capital tax of 7,  = 0.27. 
Table 2 does not report U.S.  values for the rates of return on private versus public investment: 
r, r,,  ,  and r,,  . Empirical estimates of these rates span a wide range and are very sensitive to the level 
of  data  aggregation and the statistical techniques employed (see  Aschauer  [I9931 and  Holtz-Eakin 
[1993]). In  the model, the rate of return on public investment (in both sectors) is less than the rate of 
return on private investment. This is due to the impact of distortionary taxation on firm profits and the 
higher depreciation rate of  private capital in the calibration (6>6,).  Both effects tend to reduce the 
steady-state level of private capital and hence raise its marginal product. 
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RevenuelGNP from  0.136  0.159 
RevenuelGNP from T,  0.068  0.067  ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
a~hese  are steady-state values based on  the parameters in  table 1. For variables in  the government sector, xG ,  g, and kc, 
the shadow price of public goods (PC=  0.903 from equation 1161)  was used to convert quantities into equivalent units of private goods. 
b~or  the U.S.  economy, investment, consumption. and capital averages are for 1947 to 1992. Data sources are described 
in  footnotes 4,  6, and  20. The average labor tax rates (T,) are from Bm  and Sahasakul (1986)  for 1947-83  and from McGrattan, 
Rogerson, and Wright (1993)  for 1947-87.  The average capital tax  rates (zk)  are from Jorgenson and  Sullivan (1981,  table 11) for 
1947-80  and from McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1993)  for 1947-87.  Average tax revenue data are from various issues of Revenue 
Statistics of  OECD Member Countries, 1965-1990, table 61.  Labor  tax revenue is defined to include federal and state individual 
income taxes and Social Security taxes. Capital tax revenue is defined to include federal and state corporate taxes, capital gains taxes. 
and property taxes. 
6.2  Dynamic Simulation 
6.2.1  Optimal Policy Rules 
The (approximate) solution to the government's problem yields the following set of log-linear 
optimal policy rules, which are valid in the neighborhood of the deterministic steady state. The optimal 
decision rules for private investment and private consumption have also been included for comparison. 
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Constant  I  V,  In (kit  1  In (k, 1  In (k~,  1  In (4.1  1 
The optimal behavior of  public versus private  expenditures over the business cycle can be 
inferred by  examining the coefficients on the technology shock z,  in the policy rules. For k,  and g,, 
these coefficients are both positive, implying procyclical behavior. The coefficients on v,  indicate optimal 
responses to shifts in the demand for public consumption goods. As expected, g, responds more strongly 
to preference shocks than does c,, accounting for the higher variability of g, relative to c, in the model. 
The preference shocks affect the optimal trade-off between production in the two sectors as we1 as the 
optimal mix  between  public  investment  and  public  consumption.  This  feature  is reflected  by  the 
coefficients on v,  in the investment rules. A positive value of  v,  stimulates private investment in the 
government sector x,  in order to increase production of g, .  As a result, x,, and x,,  both decline. In this 
way, preference shocks lower the contemporaneous correlation between  public investment and total 
private investment XI (=x,, +x,)  and improve the model's comparison with U.S.  data. 
The  optimal  response  of  tax  rates  to  shocks  is  governed  by  the  shock's  impact  on  the 
govemrnent budget. In general, technology shocks alter the size of the tax base, affecting revenues, while 
preference shocks alter the level of required outlays. The government responds by adjusting the capital 
tax in an  offsetting-manner. This can be  observed by  examining the coefficients on z,  and v,  in the 
decision rule for 7,.  The magnitude of  these coefficients is the  largest of  any  policy variable. A 
positive technology shock causes a large decrease in 7,.  A positive  z,  causes GNP and household 
income (the tax base) to rise, allowing the use of a lower tax on capital even though public expenditures 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmx,,  and g,  increase. In contrast, a positive preference shock v, calls for an increase in 7,  to finance a 
higher level of outlays. Absorbing shocks in this way is efficient because capital is completely inelastic 
within a given period, unlike labor supply.22  The shock-absorbing feature of 7,  allows the government 
to maintain relatively stable tax rates on labor income, reminiscent of the tax-rate-smoothing hypothesis 
of Barro (1979). Finally, notice that tax rates (and household allocations) depend on the distribution of 
private capital across sectors, as reflected by the coefficients on In (k,,)  and In (k,)  in the policy rules. 
6.2.2  Policy Simulations 
Figures 6 and 7 plot simulated public and private expenditures from the model and highlight the 
effect of preference shocks. Comparing these figures to those for the U.S. economy (figures 4b and 5b) 
reveals that preference shocks improve the model's performance. Without these shocks, x,,  and XI are 
too highly correlated (figure 6a) and g, does not show enough variability relative to c,  (figure 7a). In 
figure 6a, the series for public and private investment diverge only slightly, due to the lower depreciation 
rate of  public capital in the calibration. 
Figures 8 and 9 plot simulated tax rates from the model versus estimates of  average marginal 
tax rates for the U.S. economy. As noted earlier, the model predicts that the capital tax should be more 
variable than the labor tax.  An  eyeball comparison of the U.S. tax rate series seems to bear this out. 
Tables 4-7 provide a more quantitative comparison of  the model with postwar U.S. data." 
22~ee  Bohn (1  988). Judd (1989), and Chari. Christiano, and Kehoe (1993) for related examples of optimal shock-absorbing  policy. 
"~i~ures  8 and 9 display the tax  rate series before detrending. For quantitative comparisons (tables 6 and 7), detrending is 
necessary because the U.S.  labor tax displays a distinct upward trend, while the U.S.  capital tax displays a downward trend. These 
trends have no counterpart in  the model. The trend in  T,  is possibly linked to the phenomenon of "bracket creep," which  existed 
before tax schedules were indexed for  inflation in  1985. Regarding the trend in  T,.  Auerbach and Poterba (1988) argue that the 
downward trend is due to increasingly generous investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation schedules. 
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Cross-Correlation of GNP with Variable at r+i 
Std Dev. 
Variable  r-2  1-1  I  I+ 1  r+2 
GNP  2.48  0.03  0.38  1.00  0.38  0.03 
XG  15.61  0.09  0.39  0.55  0.23  0.02 
X  9.83  -0.14  0.19  0.96  0.44  0.13 
g  3.28  0.12  0.25  0.43  0.09  -0.08 
c  0.57  0.54  0.70  0.63  0.00  -0.30 
H  1.32  -0.24  0.08  0.86  0.45  0.20 
GNPIH  1.51  0.26  0.56  0.89  0.23  -0.12 
astatistics are mean values over 100 simulations, each 46 periods long. Before computing statistics, all series were logged 
and detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of  100. GNP=  y +  rk, +  wh, ,  X=x,  +x,  .  and H =  h, + h,. 
Table 4b:  Business-Cycle Statistics for U.S.  Economy, 1947 to 1992' 
Cross-Correlation of GNP with Variable at r+i 
Std Dev. 
Variable  1-2  I-  1  r  r+  1  r+2 
GNP  2.46  0.05  0.56  1.00  0.56  0.05 
GNPIH  (est)  1.07  -0.25  -0.10  0.4 1  0.80  0.60 
'Data  sources for GNP, investment, and consumption are described in footnotes 4, 6, and 20.  Public investment includes 
military items. Private investment is futed investment + consumer durables expenditures + residential investment. All series have been 
annualized, logged, and  detrended as in  the model. H(hh) represents total labor hours from the household  swey (LHOURS) in 
Citibase. H(est) represents total labor hours from the establishment survey (LPMHU) in Citibase. 
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Statistic  Model  U.S. Economya 
corn (H.  GNPIH)  0.53  0.16 / 4.02 
a~or  the labor market statistics, the two numbers refer to the household and establishment surveys, respectively. See the notes 
to table 4b. 
The summary statistics in tables 4 and  5 reveal that the model performs reasonably well in 
capturing the correlation structure and relative standard deviations of the aggregate variables, but is less 
successful in matching the absolute standard deviations of the investment and consumption series. In 
agreement with the data, the model predicts that private expenditures are more strongly procyclical than 
public expenditures. Although the model standard deviations for x,  and X are much higher than in the 
data (table 4), the relative magnitudes (table 5) are about right. The model standard deviations could be 
reduced  by  introducing  adjustment costs for both  types  of  investment (see  Lansing  [1993b]).  The 
standard deviations for the consumption series, g and c, display the opposite problem, i.e.,  the model 
series are less variable than the corresponding U.S. series. Once again, however, the relative variability 
in table 5 is close to the U.S. value. The two problems are no doubt linked; the excessive volatility of 
investment in the model allows for very smooth consumption. 
In the  labor market, the model predicts a lower standard deviation for total hours H than is 
observed in the U.S. data. Consequently, the model's variability of hours relative to labor productivity 
(table 5) is too low. This occurs despite the assumption of indivisible labor, which operates to increase 
the variability of H.  Also, the correlation between hours and productivity in the model is higher than 
in the data. For these two statistics, the model does not do as well as other real business-cycle models 
that treat government policy as exogenous (see Christian0 and Eichenbaum [1992], McGrattan [1991], 
and Braun [1989]).  Although not shown in table 5, the contemporaneous correlation between hours 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmworked  in  the  two  sectors, corr(h, .  h,),  averaged  0.37  in the  simulations. This  is  consistent  with 
conventional wisdom regarding the comovement of  employment in different sectors over the business 
cycle.24 
Tables 6 and 7 provide a closer examination of the behavior of policy variables. The model does 
well in matching the standard deviations and serial correlation of  the tax  rates (table 6), but  is less 
successful regarding the cross-correlations with other policy variables (tables 7a and 7b). The model's 
prediction that the capital tax should display larger variability than the labor tax is generally confirmed 
by  the data. The capital tax  series estimated by  Jorgenson and  Sullivan (1981) has  a much  higher 
standard deviation than the series estimated by McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1993). The values are 
16.38 percent and 4.82 percent, respectively. The Jorgenson and Sullivan series is an  estimate of  the 
effective corporate tax rate, while the McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright series also includes taxes paid 
by individuals on capital gains and dividends. The correlation between these two series (after detrending) 
is 0.45.  The correlation between the two estimates of the U.S.  labor tax is 0.84. 
The correlation coefficients in the model match the signs in U.S.  data for the majority of the 
cases in  table 7.  However, the model predicts signs opposite to those in the data for the correlation 
between x,  and g and the correlation between 2,  and 2,.  The predicted negative correlation between 
x,  and g (-0.36) reflects the impact of preference shocks on the optimal mix between public investment 
and public consumption. Without preference shocks, the correlation between x,  and g in the model is 
strongly positive (0.74) and close to the U.S.  value (0.85). In this case, however, model performance 
suffers in other areas, such as the relative variability of  g and c.  The predicted negative correlation 
between  2,  and  2,  is also counter to U.S.  data.  The  U.S  data display  a positive correlation, which 
suggests that there may be rigidities in the U.S.  tax code (not accounted for in the model) that link the 
movement of tax rates over the business cycle. 
24~n  a model version with different technology shocks in the two sectors, the comelation between h, and h, is negative (and hence 
counterfactual), as employment always flows into the most productive sector. This is also a characteristic of home production models 
that  specify sector-specific technology shocks for the home and market sectors. See Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright (1991). 
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U.S  U.S. 
Model'  Economvb  Economv' 
- - 
Mean 
Std. Dev. (%)  3.82  5.65  3.65 
'=hr  COIT  (-1)  0.41  0.43  0.55 
corr (-2)  0.05  -0.19  -0.09 
corr (-3)  -0.16  -0.67  -0.54  .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
Mean  0.268  0.299  0.568 
Std. Dev. (%) 
'=kt  COrr  (-1) 
corr (-2) 
corr (-3)  -0.18  -0.24  -0.27 
a~odel  statistics are means over  100 simulations, each 46 periods long. The tax rate series were detrended using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of  100. The tax rate series were not logged before detrending. 
b~, is from Bm  and Sahasakul(1986), 1947-83, and T,  is from Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981, table 11). 1947-80. 
'T,  and T,  are from McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1993), 1947-87. 
Table 7a:  Contemporaneous Correlation in Model' 
XG  g  =ri  =r,  X  c  GNP 
XG  1.00  -0.36  0.82  -0.62  0.49  0.39  0.55 
Table 7b:  Contemporaneous Correlation in U.S.  Economy' 
- 
XG  .  g  =A  Tk  X  c  GNP 
asterisk indicates that the correlation coefficient has the same sign as in  the model. For the tax rate correlations. the 
top  and  bottom numbers in  each cell are correlations using U.S.  data described in  footnotes b and  c, respectively, of  table 6. All 
variables have been detrended as in  the model. 
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The recent controversy surrounding the  productive effects of  public capital has  focused  on 
questions related to long-run growth. In contrast, this paper is concerned with the optimal behavior of 
public investment and other key elements of fiscal policy over the business cycle. While a number of 
researchers have incorporated fiscal policy into real business-cycle models, the government policymaker 
is generally treated as exogenous. This paper employs a two-sector real business-cycle model, augmented 
with preference shocks, to endogenize the choice of fiscal policy over time. 
I  subjected the model to comparisons with  postwar  U.S.  data on  public investment, public 
consumption, and  tax rates and obtained reasonable success in capturing the observed behavior of the 
various time series. At the optimal level of public capital, the rate of return on public investment is less 
than  the  rate  of  return  on  private  investment. The model  predicts  procyclical  behavior  for public 
investment and public consumption, in contrast to the Keynesian view of  countercyclical fiscal policy. 
It also predicts a positive  tax on  capital that should be  more variable than the labor tax. The model 
disagrees with the data, most notably, in predicting negative correlations between public investment and 
public consumption and between the capital tax and the labor tax. 
A natural  extension of  this  work  would  be  to  incorporate heterogeneity, since it is highly 
probable  that  key  elements of  fiscal policy,  such  as  the  capital tax,  are  driven  by  distributional 
considerations (see Lansing [1993a]). Further research is also needed  to address the many  empirical 
questions suggested by  this work, including formal tests of model predictions and direct estimation of 
parameter values. In addition, much work remains to be done in modeling the institutional structure of 
the tax  code and  endogenizing the choice of  tax  instruments, topics that  have been  emphasized by 
Slemrod (1  990). 
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A.l  Recursive Formulation of  the Government's Problem 
To formulate the recursive version of (1 9), we first substitute the household first-order conditions 
from (7) into the household budget constraint (2), the private-sector resource constraint (20), and the 
utility  function  U(-)  to  eliminate  z,,  z,,  and  c, .' In  addition,  g,  can  be  eliminated  using  the 
government-sector resource constraint (19.v). The vector of state variables for the govemment's problem 
is s, ={z,,  v, ,  k,, ,  k,  ,  k,,  ,  h ,., ). In the transformed problem, the government's decision variables are h,  , 
h,, ,  h,,  k,,,, ,  k,,,  ,  and kc+,  .  Using primes (') to denote next-period quantities, the recursive version 
of the government's problem is shown in (A.l). 
The  Bellman  equation  in  (A.1)  summarizes the  recursive nature  of  the  problem.  The  first 
constraint is the household budget after substituting in the first-order conditions. The symbol u represents 
a composite error term that arises due to the presence of E, in the first-order condition for h,,.  The next 
constraint is the private-sector resource constraint. The government-sector resource constraint has been 
substituted into U(.).  The remaining constraints define the cost minimization condition, the production 
technologies, the rental rate on private capital, and the laws of  motion for the two exogenous shocks. 
The dynamic programming problem applies for all t >  0. The problem at t=O must be considered 
separately, as shown by  Kydland and Prescott (1980), Lucas and Stokey (1983), and Chamley (1986). 
At  t=O, the stock of  private capital is fixed. Optimal policy thus implies a high initial tax  on  capital to 
take full advantage of  this nondistortionary source of  revenue. I assume that this form of  lump-sum 
taxation is insufficient to finance the entire stream of  future expenditures. The analysis here will focus 
on  policy  in  stationary  stochastic  equilibrium,  i.e.,  when  t  is  very  large.  The  linear-quadratic 
approximation method used to solve (A.1) is  accurate only in the neighborhood of  the deterministic 
steady  state.  Consequently, I  do not  solve the  t=O  problem  or compute the  transition  path  to the 
stationary equilibrium. 
'~ue  to the presence of the  expectation operator in the  fmt-order conditions for ki,,  (i=1,2), the substitution is accomplished 
using  the  expression  E ,., f,  (-1  = f, (-1  - u,, where  f,  (-) is  a function  of  random  variables  and  u,  is  the  forecast  error.  The 
assumption of rational expectations implies E ,.,u, =  0. 
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k;.  k;,  k;. 
h,. h,. 
where  S=  Iz, V, kl, k2, kc,  h-,) 
U  ( -)  =  ln(1b) - A(hl + h,)  + exp(v)B  h[y,  -k,'  +(I-6,)k,] 
subject to 
A  A-1  -(hl  +h,) +-(kl  + k2) +(I-0,-0,)y 
h  PA  r -6  /-(k;+k;)  -h  +U = 0 
1 
Y  - -  h  - klf - k,'  + (1-6)(kl +k2)  = 0 
Arrow and Kurz (1970) prove the existence of a unique, stationary equilibrium in a one-sector 
economy similar to the one developed here. Uzawa (1966) proves existence and uniqueness in a two- 
sector model with a production tax, but excludes public capital. Although I do not prove existence and 
uniqueness, analogy  to these  other models suggests that  the  model possesses a  unique,  stationary 
equilibrium  The  computational algorithm (described  below)  always converged  to the  same value 
function regardless of the initial starting point. Equilibrium is defined as a value function V(s)  and an 
associated set of stationary decision rules that satisfy (A. 1). The decision rules dictate a set of household 
allocations and prices at time t that can be implemented by  means of the government's chosen policy. 
The government's explicit policy rules for tax rates and public expenditures are recovered by substituting 
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